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DEROGATION FROM PROCEDURE IN TURBULENT ENVIRONMENTS:  
DISCRETIONARY ACTION AS A COLLECTIVE COMPETENCE OF TEAMS IN 
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In making a conceptual contribution to the development of high reliability theory, this paper 
takes a critical view of the notion of procedure within organizational repertories of action.  It 
contrasts the essential requirement for procedures, that the environment is sufficiently stable 
to allow antecedent rationality to design organizational responses, with the increasing 
environmental turbulence being experienced and theoretically developed, to propose that 
organizational reliability will increasingly depend on discretionary action or derogation from 
procedure.  It proposes that this notion of derogation from procedure, when viewed from the 
perspective of the increasing use of team-based work organization implies collective 
competence.  It moves next to propose that for this to be credible an understanding of the 
characteristics of discretionary action, currently absent from the literature and therefore 
absent from substantive theory, is essential.  It concludes by suggesting that a current piece of 
doctoral research into this phenomenon will fill an important empirical gap with implications 
for theory and for practice 
 
Introduction and Background 
The notion of organizational reliability, which Weick et al (1999) conceptualize as the 
capacity to work effectively in dynamic and unpredictable circumstances, is a vital 
competence in contemporary organizations (Bigley and Roberts, 2001).  As more 
organisations move to privilege the concept of reliability over efficiency eg. education 
(Stringfield, 1994) telecommunications (Cox, 1998), pastorialism (Roe et al, 1998), medicine 
(Reason, 2000), they find that their respective fields currently have only tentative conceptual 
models which align with their specific contexts.  Reliability challenges the orthodoxy and 
received wisdom of traditional management strategies, since it takes as a point of departure 
that human endeavour is based, in various combinations, on enduring, rationally derived 
procedures and free extemporization (Ryle, 1979; Laporte and Consolini, 1991).  Together, 
these procedural and discretionary ‘routines’ (Pentland and Reuter, 1994), represent the 
repertory of acceptable activity within reliable organizations however, any given repertory 
exists in a tension between, on the one hand, a complex mix of historical antecedents and 
contemporary influences and, on the other, the turbulence of the environment.  The notion of 
rationally designed organizations, their characteristics and procedures, is well researched and 
documented in both supportive and critical texts (Taylor, 1947; Weber, 1947; Fayol 1949; 
Braverman, 1974; Kouzmin 1980).  This paper reviews the theoretical explications of both 
procedural and discretionary actions, placing them in the context of organizational reliability.  
It argues that while the notion of procedure as an organizational response to its environment is 
well explicated it is increasingly demonstrated as flawed, given the turbulence of 
organizational environments.  It goes on to argue that, in response to environmental 
turbulence at the operational level, the mix of procedural and discretionary action is changing, 
but that, since the characteristics of discretionary action are not well researched, the potential 
for reducing reliability increases.  Taken together these have implications for further research 
into the phenomenon of discretionary action as a contribution to the development of high 
reliability as a theoretical concept and organizational reliability as practice.  Working from 
extant theory the paper suggests a new research direction, which investigates the 
characteristics of discretionary action as enacted at the workgroup, or team, level as a 
counterpoint to traditional proceduralized approaches. 
 
 
A Critique of Current Concepts 
The pervasive, oligarchic structure of traditional, formal organizations leads to a conceptual, 
and to an hierarchical, split between an autonomous elite of ‘thinkers’ and a cohort of ‘doers’ 
(Taylor, 1947; Fayol, 1949).  These bureaucratic (Weber 1947) socio-technical systems are 
designed, and organizational activity is therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, predetermined, 
in a rational way (Roberts, 1990; Laporte and Consolini, 1991; Rochlin, 1999).    In these 
organizations, the most common mechanisms for work supervision and co-ordination 
(Mintzberg 1989) is the use of procedures, or standardization of work, and direct supervision.  
The methods by which an organization co-ordinates its activities have also been described by 
Pentland and Reuter (1984) as ‘routines’, which fall into two main categories – effortful 
accomplishments and automatic responses.   The former relates most closely to systems and 
procedures while the latter relates to taken-for-granted methods of organizing.  The notion of 
procedure, therefore, is here taken to mean some rationally designed routine, which takes a 
codified and articulated form within an organization: hence, ‘normal procedures’, ‘emergency 
procedures’, ‘standard operating procedures’ etc.  In addition, procedures are taken to entail 
some form of prescription, they must be adhered to, and/or some form of proscription in that 
they define, explicitly or implicitly, what must not be done.  They represent the limits, in 
positive and negative forms, of essentially the same phenomenon – they express in formal 
language the activity in which it is deemed proper for the organization, teams or individual 
operators to indulge.  However, the notion of discretionary action allows for routines that do 
not involve the kind of antecedent rationality evident in procedures.  The meta-notion of 
routine therefore usefully offers a language for describing both procedure and the less 
bureaucratically constrained actions of discretion.  
 
It remains a moot point among organizational researchers as to what extent organizational 
activity can, or indeed should, be proceduralized.  As Tranfield et al (2001) note, traditional 
approaches to organizational performance continue to be driven largely by the efficiency 
mind-set, the focus of which is to apply tried and tested procedures (e.g., Total Quality 
Management), to seek zero-deviation from norms (e.g., 6Sigma) and to increase efficiency 
(e.g., lean production).  As laudable as these aims may be, making procedural input, rather 
than reliable output, the focus requires an implicit assumption that the two are necessarily, 
and unexceptionally, causally related.  However, as systems theorist Jan Smuts observed, such 
relations tend to derive from isolation of the most luminous elements of events which precede 
other events and label those causes, and then to isolate the most luminous elements of events 
which follow and label those effects (Smuts, 1926), ignoring the extent to which a cause may 
be a whole situation which imperceptibly passes into another whole situation, or effect.   The 
strong predictive inferences taken as a result are enshrined in a general philosophical 
perspective, which is reducible to the classical scientific method, with its a strong realist 
ontology, positivist epistemology and faith in algorithmic solutions dominated by 
probabilistic interpretations of statistical data (Barrow, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2002; Kosko 1994, 
Paulos, 1998), and appear to be based on a wager.  The wager is that the circumstances for 
which the procedures are configured, whatever empirical regularities have been observed in 
the past, will necessarily obtain in the future.  The wager analogy here is interesting, since 
Paulos (1998) accredits the formalization of probabilistic prediction to 17th century attempts 
by Pascal and Fermat to solve problems in gambling, while statistics have their origin in 
mortality tables compiled in the same century.  The current usage of both could be seen to 
betray their antecedents, an irony on which we need not dwell.  In the context of management 
these predictions carry undertones of scientific management and administrative orthodoxy 
(Taylor, 1947; Fayol, 1949; Urwick, 1947).  At the individual worker level, especially in 
highly routinized task environments, as much as 95% of the work may be routinized with only 
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5% discretionary, and that is often limited to the less important aspects of the job (Wickens, 
1992), rarely granting workers a central role in innovation and often depending on task 
hierarchies rather than acceptance of more flexible work forms (Kraft and Dubnoff, 1986).  
For this whole enterprise to be credible we must make a further assumption, which in some 
environments may be valid, that the environment is either tranquil, or predictably dynamic.   
 
Complexity scholars (Gell-Mann, 1994; Waldrop, 1994; Byrne, 1998) question this, at both 
the quantum and classical levels, and propose that there are few actions that can be 
legitimately predicated on the assumption that inputs are linearly converted into outputs, in a 
predictable manner, or that the environment remains sufficiently tranquil or predictably 
dynamic, for unmoderated procedures to provide reliable responses.  There is a growing 
corpus of other literature which describes how activity, whether initiated by natural agency, as 
in meteorology (e.g. Lorenz 1963), or by human agency, as in economics (e.g. Arthur, 1990), 
involves non-linear feedback mechanisms, a concept now also being applied to domains as 
diverse as urban studies and health (Byrne, 1998), and software development (Johnson, 2001).   
It is also fundamental that while a weather forecast cannot change the weather, a social 
forecast can change the way that society acts, rendering the forecast valid, as is the nature of 
forecasts, but void (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Kosko 1994).  Illuminating the debate from the 
symbolic interactionist perspective (Bryman, 1988) suggests that, for humans, any stimulus 
for action will undergo a process of interpretation before a response emerges, rather than 
simply provoking a response (Skinner, 1965), a notion that Zimmer (2001) claims may have 
an evolutionary basis.  This resonates with Laing’s notion of ontological discontinuity 
between human beings and it beings (Laing, 1967), which posits that instead of simply 
reacting to external stimuli, humans reflect on experienced phenomena and conjecture first on 
possible causes and second on suitable responses.  Working from a philosophical perspective, 
Ryle (1979) postulates that all individual human actions are improvisational in that they will 
differ from previous actions in some way, even when identifiably similar, whether this is due 
to caprice or contextual sensitivity.  These considerations call into question the extent to 
which rational design of organizational responses can be universally credible, even within the 
domain of the organizational context; a position exacerbated by the inevitable incompleteness 
of our knowledge (Simon, 1976; Williamson, 1979).  Essentially this means that since all 
possible options cannot be considered, our decisions, and their concomitant procedures, 
however rational, are, at the very least, matters of probability rather than certainty, and will 
increasingly rest on notions of credibility rather than strict probability (Ayer, 1976).   As 
described by Ayer, and reflecting the Humean concept that, while we may never know the 
truth, we may be well enough informed to make reasonable choices about the future, the 
notion of credibility: 
 
‘… implies that we have reason to feel at least more confident than not that such and such an 
event will come about. (Ayer, 1976:163). 
 
As soon as we begin dealing with statements of credibility rather than statements of either 
probability or, in the limit, the pure, mathematical calculus of chance, then the assumed 
connection between prediction/procedure and the presenting situation becomes increasingly 
less direct and therefore less dependable.  Three theoretical frameworks exemplify this 
interpretation.  In the social sciences, first, from an economic perspective, Simon (1976) 
proposes that we lack the resources to consider all the information that may bear on a 
decision, leading to managers ‘satisficing’.  In the same context, Williamson (1979) goes 
further, to propose that we simply can never have enough information to make infinitely 
accurate decisions.  A similar view emphasizes the limits of calculative rationality (Dreyfus 
3 
and Dreyfus, 1986; 1999).  Second, Rittel and Webber (1973) identify a class of problems 
(referred to as wicked), which, since they cannot be exhaustively described at the outset, can 
have no obvious solutions.  Rather, legitimate attempts at resolutions generate waves of 
consequences, each of which will be more or less wicked, and so on ad infinitum.  The third, 
and perhaps most significant, because it questions perhaps the most formal of all sciences, 
mathematical logic, is grounded in the philosophical notion of vagueness (Russell, 1923; 
Smuts, 1926; Black, 1937).  Often derided in the natural sciences as the philosophy of 
ignorance or simple sloppy thinking (see for example, Williamson, 1994), it is intended to 
connote the impossibility of achieving the absolute clarity of understanding on which accurate 
prediction depends; a concept which seems increasingly tenable now as complexity sciences 
develop.  Contemporary articulations of vagueness – fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 
1965; Kosko, 1994) – imply that predictions about the future will not follow the Aristotlean 
logic of A or not-A, rather they will include A and not-A to some indefinable extent.  In the 
social sciences, where inferences have to be drawn from observables, where mediating 
cognitions influence the way in which the environment is interpreted and where predictions 
can change actions, the notion of vagueness gains relevance. 
 
Together, these perspectives call into serious question our ability, once divorced from the 
world of the natural and physical sciences, to make substantive predictions about the future 
and therefore our ability to design detailed procedures meet for all occasions; a conclusion 
which presents problems for theoreticians and for practitioners. 
 
A Discretionary Response 
Of common ground among a range of authors is the need to match activity to presenting 
circumstances rather than to those predicted.  For example, Adler, Goldonftas and Levine 
(1999) emphasize how the structural and procedural features of bureaucratic control, which 
may prove useful in stable environments, vary from severely limiting to useless in turbulent 
task environments.  Engestrom (1990, 2000) illustrates how, in general, all successful activity 
represents a necessary alignment with temporally significant environmental characteristics 
and only a contingent alignment with any prediction.  Bigley and Roberts (2001) propose that 
coherent response entails that activity maps to the requisite variety (Simon 1957) of the 
situation.  It follows that procedures only apply when temporally significant environmental 
characteristics are those that are both predictable and predicted – that is in stable/tranquil 
environments.  In turbulent environments, as the transient rate of exogenous change outpaces 
rational planning cycles (Burgelman et al, 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997) and the 
experienced environmental characteristics differ increasingly from any predictions, rationally 
developed procedures become variously inadequate, inappropriate, or obsolete (Eisenhardt 
1989).  Further, in turbulent environments, characteristics differ from predictions in high-
velocity and error-sensitive ways (Roberts and Rouseau, 1989; Weick et al, 1999), rendering 
rational reconfiguration of procedures impractical (Eisenhardt, 1989).  To place the 
procedural response argument in stark relief, in the subway tragedy in Korea of February 
2003, the procedures for dealing with underground emergencies included electrical isolation 
of the rail system.  In this case this led to a train unaffected by the initial conflagration being 
enveloped because it was in marooned on the opposite platform, unable to depart because of 
the electrical isolation. 
 
But, in order to achieve reliability in turbulent environments, with what might we replace 
procedures?  To avoid the barbarism of having a procedure for not following procedures, one 
possible answer is a routine (Pentland and Reuter, 1994) of derogation from procedure, with 
the attendant discretion to act in ways which a) are sensitive to temporally significant 
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environmental characteristics and b) accomplish the task, but which c) vary from procedure 
(Carpenter and Golden, 1997), being delegated to the operational level.  In conceptualizing a 
spectrum of activity, which has been described as ranging from the prescriptively normative 
to the spontaneously inventive (Crossan and Sorrenti, 1997; Hatch, 1998), Handy (1985) 
draws on work by Stewart (1983) to invoke the notion of the ‘inside-out doughnut’, with a 
solid center (prescribed, normative), a solid outer boundary (proscribed, normative) and an 
empty inter-space (discretionary, inventive).  While this is a useful conceptual model, it 
remains arguable that truly discretionary action may involve ignoring both prescriptions and 
proscriptions.  The phenomenon of discretionary action is reported by many authors (Crossan 
and Sorrenti, 1997; Hatch, 1998; Mirvis, 1998; Weick, 1998; Bigley and Roberts, 2001; 
Chelariu et al, 2002).  Most often expressed, somewhat indiscriminately as improvisation and 
related to an over-extended metaphorical allusion to jazz, the phenomenon of discretionary 
action is nowhere described in terms of fundamental and discrete characteristics.  One 
possible reason for the dearth of empirical study in this area of the social sciences may be 
that, by definition, formal procedures are codified, explicit and delimited activities, and are 
often policed by organizational or higher level regulation.  But, as action becomes 
discretionary it also becomes, by extension, less amenable to delimitation and regulation.  
However, this is not the same as suggesting that discretionary action has no fundamental and 
discrete characteristics.  It is neither intellectually beguiling nor academically rigorous simply 
to identify discretionary activity as non-procedural activity or something akin to jazz 
improvisation, and leave it at that.  A new research trajectory could usefully establish what 
the fundamental and discrete characteristics of discretionary action are. 
 
The literature that speaks most explicitly to the topic of autonomous choice resides largely in 
the psychology and social psychology canons (Carpenter and Golden, 1997; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Mischel 1977, Rotter, 1966) and deals, 
almost exclusively, with individual perceptions of individual discretionary authority within 
the context of overall organizationally acceptable levels of discretion.  This literature also 
concentrates on top management echelons.  In the management literature, discretion is also 
addressed from the top management decision-making perspective (e.g., Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976) and its strategic impact.  The topic of improvisation has 
received much attention as a metaphor for organizing (Crossan and Sorrenti, 1996; Hatch, 
1998; Mirvis, 1998; Weick 1998) but improvisation represents a limiting case and does not 
fully capture the range of activity by which we may deviate from procedure.  Reliability has 
been investigated from the perspectives of organizational design by the Berkeley Group, from 
the perspective of human agency by Marone and Woodhouse (1986) and from the perspective 
of the search for safety rather than the mitigation of error by Wildavsky (1988).  However, the 
specific role of derogation from procedure as a credible organizational routine for reliability is 
less well explored. 
 
Nonetheless, most commentators agree that sooner or later we come across a problem or set 
of problems that is not tractable by applying the "standard" approaches and tools that came 
with our selected profession or the procedures and routines which are prescribed at the sector 
or organizational level.   This is well illustrated by Laporte and Consolini (1991 p32) who 
note that critical operational functions which are complex and tightly coupled contain a) jobs 
which can be specified in detail and b) contingencies.  To quote some prosaic but illuminating 
examples, the TV listings for 25 May 00 presented an illuminating if non-rigorous 
opportunity to observe two contexts in which the hazard was high, risk was variable and yet 
where reliable outcomes were critical.  The first was a documentary entitled ‘The Missileers’ 
which was an overview of the Minuteman ICBM missile crews in the continental United 
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States.  The second was an episode in the drama series ‘Always and Everyone’, which 
focused on the activities of a fictitious major accident and emergency (A&E) unit and the 
programme that night was clearly a dramatized version of the rescue operations which 
followed the Kegworth air crash.  In the Missileers the key demand on the teams was absolute 
conformity and near perfection in a zero-defect culture based on rationally derived and 
operationally prescribed procedures.  This was to deliver what Cox (1998) refers to as ‘surety’ 
or the confidence that a system will perform in acceptable ways in both intended and 
unintended circumstances.  The Missileers were also of course dealing with a nuclear weapon 
system, which both Perrow (1984) and Sagan (1993) characterized as having high 
catastrophic potential.  In A & E a ‘saticficing’ (Simon, 1957) approach was used.  Responses 
combined triage (prioritization) and bricolage (making do with the resources to hand) in acts 
of spontaneous invention in the hazardous environment of the severely damaged and unstable 
aircraft fuselage.  To compensate for the lack of theatre based surgical and support resources, 
an extreme example was to save life with mutilating surgery, which might have been 
avoidable if the patients had already been in a fully equipped surgery.  In the first example, 
procedures were rigidly prescribed and deviation just as rigidly proscribed, and in the second 
the framework of procedures was more loosely prescribed with actors both organizationally 
authorized and occupationally empowered to use discretion and invention.  In a third 
example, during a newscast transmitted immediately prior to the surgery to separate Siamese 
twins, undertaken in Manchester, a retired expert in peri-natal surgery described how the 
surgical team could plan for many of the eventualities but also emphasized that once the 
surgery was commenced the team would encounter situations for which planning was not 
possible, except perhaps in the most generalized sense of being ready for anything.  This latter 
concept argues for more rather than less autonomy of action, or discretion as conceptualized 
here.  Albeit that these examples are in bounded contexts, the learning potential in extreme 
environments is held to be greater than that in tranquil, benign environments (Pettigrew 
1974).  If we extend this concept to include the researcher, then arguably, credible theory, 
applicable beyond the bounded context of the research, is more likely to emerge from extreme 
contexts. 
  
In all three cases above, the socio-technical systems involved had to perform with high 
reliability, but activity was distributed along a continuum from prescription through discretion 
to invention.  Interestingly, in the military context actions were exclusively prescribed, in the 
A&E context actions were largely invented, and in the Siamese twins case actions along the 
whole spectrum were envisioned.  When dealing with contingencies there is therefore a need 
for rapid adjustment not easily directed from hierarchical levels which are not in contact with 
the problem and:  
 
‘In such times organizational norms dictate non-interference with operators, who are expected 
to use considerable discretion.’ (emphasis added) (Laporte and Consolini, 1991:32) 
 
This ‘norm’, which requires the use of ‘considerable discretion’, leads us to the need to 
identify just what characteristics discretionary and inventive actions at the operational (team) 
level have.  Taken together, past applications of the notion of discretion have produced some 
useful beginning concepts.  Combining elements from Moorman and Miner (1998) and Weick 
(1998) a suitable starting point is: 
 
‘Activity which progressively diverges from established procedure and for which planning 
and execution progressively converge in time’ 
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Within these explications we can also detect continua of divergence from procedure variously 
described as: shift – switch – revise – create  (Moorman and Miner, 1998), interpret – 
embellish – vary – improvise (Weick, 1998) such that the divergence is expressed as (a) a 
qualitative difference or (b) an incremental quantitative variation or (c) a continuous 
progression in what Weick (1998) calls ‘full system improvisation’.  However, these represent 
behavioural descriptions rather than fundamental characteristics of discretionary activity. 
 
A Meso-level Perspective 
If we now consider the possible incidence of discretionary action at three easily identifiable 
organizational levels, the individual or micro-level, the workgroup or meso-level and the 
organizational or macro-level, a number of issues arises.  Ryle (1979) suggests that 
instantaneous invention is observable in almost all micro-level activity, meaning that almost 
all individual human actions are to some extent variations from norms and therefore 
improvised, while Weick (1998) is representative of a broad view that discretion and 
improvisation are difficult to conceptualize, much less observe, as macro-level phenomena.  
This challenges Moorman and Miner (1998) who have conceptualized organizational 
improvisation as both an application and a source of organizational memory.   Their position 
seems to conflate ‘sub-organizational level improvisation’ with ‘organizational-level 
outcomes’ rather than to demonstrate organizational improvisation per se.  As Weick (1998) 
observes, the notion of a whole organization engaged in discretionary action in a co-
coordinated way is difficult to envision.  Conversely, it has been established that that meso-
level discretionary action not only exists as an observable phenomenon but also has an 
influence on performance (see for example Crossan and Sorrenti, 1997; Hatch, 1997). 
  
The significance of the team as a vehicle for discretionary action reflects the increasing 
preference for organizations to configure around a work-group concept.  As Tranfield et al 
(1998) note, this generic concept includes, jointly and severally, shared purpose, 
identification, a collectivity of interdependent individuals and skill sets, co-ordination by 
mutual adjustment etc.  It perhaps begs the question to assume that co-coordinated 
discretionary action necessarily takes place only within teams, but the activity-theoretic ideas 
of Vygotsky (1978) allow us the term ‘collectivity’, which includes both groups and teams.  
The significance of discretionary action in a collectivity is that, inter alia, whether or not it is 
initiated by an individual, if it is to be effective and to avoid the potential for disaster, it will 
require co-ordination.  Where mutual adjustment is the co-coordinating mechanism 
(Mintzberg, 1989; Tranfield et al, 1998) the adjustments themselves, as well as any 
consequential activities, will be discretionary.  The co-ordination of multi-actor (more than 
one actor) and multi-level (different numbers and combinations of actors) discretionary action 
can therefore be said to represent a real and present challenge for organizations.  Focusing on 
the team level of action also heeds Schulman’s invocation that: 
 
A great deal more needs to be learned about the dynamics of organizations seeking and 
maintaining reliability in very demanding circumstances before we can fully understand how 
the balance between holistic control and heroics might be chosen. (1996:72) 
 
That meaningful group activity can be an emergent characteristic of fragmented, 
differentiated, independent activity is already well researched (Hutchins, 1991).  The focus 
here is on the spontaneous and harmonized use of discretion by a number of actors working in 
a group on a single definable task, what Vygotsky (1978) calls an activity system.  But, as 
Sandberg (2000) observes, for an activity system to work reliably it must develop collective 
competence and collective consciousness, not simply to be able to perform discretionary 
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actions, but to use its potential to greatest effect.    Collective competence is conceptualized as 
interaction between several people engaged in the same activity, each contributing a specific 
and differentiated individual competence, based on a shared understanding of the collective 
work and goals. 
 
The concept of team-level discretion is reported as most tractable and observable when the 
team works in close proximity on the same task in organizational communities or 
occupational communities (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984).  The difference is important since 
in the former the organization in which the actors exist dictates the rules, norms and 
procedures.  In the latter, professional guidance is extra-organizational, for example, 
accountants (Chartered Institute), surgeons (Royal Colleges), etc.  In most contexts an 
element of both is present.  When these teams are empowered to use discretion to construct 
actions in environments where that activity is what Pinker (1997) describes as purpose pulled 
(eg. realized reliability is more important than procedural conformity) rather than cause 
pushed (eg. procedural conformity is paramount) then discretion becomes both a routine 
which is a unifying mechanism for the group (Blackler, 1993) and a credible activity in 
reliability.  For example, the radical use of activities and artifacts in a manner demonstrably, 
indeed necessarily, disconnected from established procedures made the recovery of Apollo 13 
possible (Lovell & Kluger, 1995).  It is also arguable in this case that it was the application of 
occupational rather than organizational influences that made the recovery possible. 
 
Conclusion and Implications for Further Research 
The increasing turbulence in organizational environments, with the concomitant reduction in 
predictability, suggests that reliance on rationally designed procedural responses becomes less 
dependable.  Since a) the environment frequently misaligns with prediction (worked from 
established antecedents or best guess forecasts) and that b) humans interpose a cognitive 
process between stimulus and response, which leads to contextual modification even when 
procedures exist, then for organizations to operate with high reliability, there may be a case to 
include discretionary action in the repertory of acceptable organizational activity at all levels.  
Here discretionary implies that actions are configured, somewhat improvizationally, in 
contact with the presenting problem and not prescribed by the organizational hierarchy 
through procedure.  Interestingly, in none of the foregoing literature, most of which accepts 
both tacitly and explicitly to varying degrees the need for discretion, is there much evidence 
that the characteristics of discretionary action are well understood.  By this interpretation the 
concept as currently used represents at best an allusion and, at worst, an illusion.    Nothing in 
this argument suggests that procedures do not have their place, rather that the selective 
introduction of discretionary responses increases the chances of reliable outcomes.  With the 
emergence of team-based work practices, this further suggests that the ability of teams to 
invent and coordinate contextually sensitive responses has the potential to make a significant 
contribution to organizational reliability.  This notion makes a conceptual contribution to 
theory.  However, for this conceptual contribution to carry weight it requires to be 
demonstrated, which suggests that there is a clear empirical gap.  In addressing the empirical 
issue, two options are available.  First we may take a quantitative, hypothetico-deductive 
approach, but this would require that the phenomenon was understood and could be measured 
in some way, what Gibbs, Morgan and Taylor (1980) refer to as a first order perspective.  
However, it is the thrust of this paper that, notwithstanding the tacit, and to some extent 
explicit, acceptance of the significance of discretionary action in reliability, the characteristics 
of discretionary action are poorly explicated, if at all in any meaningful sense.  This suggests 
that, in order to place discretionary action within the repertory of organizational activity with 
confidence, a first move must be to understand the characteristics of the phenomenon.  Here 
8 
Gibbs et al (1980) propose that when the phenomenon itself is the object of investigation then 
a second order perspective is required.  Taking a second order perspective indicates that a 
grounded, qualitative, inductive approach is needed.  For example, discretionary action may 
have characteristics such as bricolage, which Levi-Strauss (1967) defines as making do with 
the materials to hand.  When planning and action are closely proximal, resources may indeed 
be limited to those at hand, which in turn may limit the action options.  Intuition or 
spontaneous judgment not based on exhaustive, conscious trains of reasoning (Turing, 1936) 
may be useful in high velocity situations when time for formal analysis is not available.   The 
validity of these intuitions may then depend on what Turing (1936) goes on to describe as 
ingenuity, or the suitable arrangement of intuitive steps.  As this review has shown, there are 
no extant explications of such issues.  Let us lastly, then, consider how these concepts might 
be translated into a research project 
 
For research into this phenomenon to be meaningful it will be useful for the contexts to be 
rich in discretionary action (Weick, 1998), performed by experts (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, 
1999) with reliable outcomes (Roberts, 1990).  Organizations constructed specifically for, or 
able to respond routinely to, extreme situations have been categorized as (high) reliable 
organizations (Grabowski and Roberts, 2000), exhibiting continuous, nearly error-free 
operation in turbulent and often hazardous task environments (Roberts, 1990).  Exemplars are 
of aircraft carrier operations, air traffic control operations, accident and emergency 
departments, and fire crash rescue emergency services.  These extreme environments (Perrow, 
1974) also offer the greatest learning potential.  It is also posited that it will be more credible 
to generalize from extreme to tranquil environments rather than the reverse. Research in these 
contexts therefore carries the potential to discover fundamental characteristics of discretionary 
action, the explication of which would lead to a better understanding of the phenomenon.  
This understanding would make a contribution to high reliability theory especially as it relates 
to repertories of action.   In turn this would make a contribution to practice by enabling 
organizations to develop routines for derogation from procedure. 
 
The arguments deployed in this paper, coupled with the emergent empirical gap, second order 
perspective and exemplar research contexts are being used to guide a current piece of doctoral 
research with the Cranfield School of Management.  The outcomes also have the potential to 
be an important aid for those whom Tranfield et al (1998) call ‘organizational designers and 
engineers’ in breaking free from the bureaucratic and efficiency mindsets. 
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